As a new year dawns in Ghana, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and John Dramani Mahama have returned to power amid a palpable mix of relief and skepticism. Many Ghanaians welcomed the change after eight years of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), hoping for a restoration of sound governance and economic stability. Early signs are indeed encouraging: inflation has swiftly retreated to single digits, interest rates are coming down, and the economy is rebounding from crisis. In the streets of Accra and Kumasi, there is cautious optimism that the excesses of the previous government – from fiscal indiscipline to democratic backsliding – are being corrected. Yet beneath this relief lies an unsettling sense of déjà vu. Seasoned observers note that Ghana has been here before. The positive upshoots of the NDC’s first year may be nothing more than the familiar honeymoon of a new government, one that historically gives way to the same old cycle of complacency and mismanagement.
The Perennial Eight-Year Cycle
Ghana’s democracy has settled into a predictable eight-year alternation of power between the NPP and NDC. No party has managed to secure a third consecutive term since the Fourth Republic began in 1992. Each change of government is driven by public disappointment with unkept promises and mounting hardship – a pattern so regular that voters “predictably vote for change every eight years”. This political rhythm brings with it an economic cycle as well. A new administration often starts by tightening belts and restoring macroeconomic stability, only to see fiscal restraint unravel as the next election approaches.
Mahama’s comeback appears to be following this script so far. After inheriting an economy battered by debt and inflation, the NDC government’s early policies – under the watchful eye of an International Monetary Fund program – have tamed the chaos. By October 2025, Ghana’s inflation rate had fallen to 8% (a four-year low) from over 22% a year prior, marking the ninth consecutive monthly decline. The cedi currency, which had been one of the world’s worst-performing in 2022, staged a dramatic turnaround, appreciating roughly 35% against the U.S. dollar in 2025 amid improved investor confidence and booming export prices. The central bank responded by cutting its benchmark interest rate – a 350 basis-point reduction to 21.5% in September 2025 – to support the recovering economy. Meanwhile, Ghana’s GDP growth has rebounded to a respectable pace. The economy expanded 6.3% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2025, up from about 5.7% in the same period of the previous year. Services and agriculture are leading the charge, and forecasters see growth in the 5–6% range for the near term – a far cry from the anemic 0.5% contraction Ghana suffered at the height of its crisis in 2023.
These figures paint a picture of a country pulled back from the brink. To a public that endured over 50% inflation and a collapsing currency in late 2022, the relief is tangible. “We are a people battered by economic crises and hardships. But there’s hope on the horizon,” President Mahama assured Ghanaians at his January 2025 inauguration. Indeed, Ghana’s return to single-digit inflation and a stabilized currency under the new government recalls earlier turnarounds. When the NDC last took over from the NPP in 2009, it similarly inherited double-digit inflation and managed to bring it to around 8% by 2010-2011. And when the NPP assumed power in 2017, they too slashed inflation from over 15% to about 9% within two years. In each case, however, the story did not end with the honeymoon. Ghana’s “paradox” is that respectable growth and temporary macro stability have never translated into lasting fiscal health or structural change. Instead, boom times and commodity windfalls are often squandered, public debt mounts, and the average citizen sees little improvement in living standards – until disillusionment sets in and voters once again show incumbents the door.
Early Gains Rooted in Discipline – and Familiar Factors
To the Mahama administration’s credit, it has moved quickly to signal a break from its predecessors’ excesses. Fiscal discipline and governance reforms were cornerstones of Mahama’s 2024 campaign pledge to “reset Ghana”. In power, the NDC’s initial actions have largely aligned with that promise. The new government implemented austerity measures to rein in the deficit, which had ballooned under the previous regime’s free-spending ways. High-level corruption and profligacy were key issues that drove public anger at the outgoing NPP government. In response, Mahama formed a leaner government as an example of belt-tightening: he slashed the number of ministries from 30 under Nana Akufo-Addo to just 23, merging or scrapping nearly a quarter of ministries to cut costs. This marked shift toward a compact administration was lauded by civil society groups and fiscal watchdogs as both symbolic and practical, trimming the bloated bureaucracy that the NPP had been criticized for. Other cost-saving measures soon followed, including limits on new government vehicles and a freeze on certain public-sector hiring – all aimed at restoring confidence that Ghana would live within its means.
The early economic recovery owes much to these efforts at responsible stewardship. Government spending in 2025 rose only modestly – about 3.7% year-on-year, a slower pace than the previous year. By holding off the temptation to splurge despite higher revenues, the NDC signaled a commitment to stabilize public finances. This prudent approach helped Ghana meet IMF targets for reducing the deficit and shoring up foreign reserves. In fact, Ghana narrowly avoided a default in 2022 and secured a multibillion-dollar IMF bailout in 2023; Mahama’s government has so far kept that program on track, steering clear of the brinkmanship that typically accompanies Ghanaian election-year budgets. It has not gone unnoticed that Ghana’s current resurgence is happening under the strict discipline of an IMF agreement, much as an earlier IMF program in 2015-2016 forced the then-NDC government to control spending before the 2016 elections. The presence of the Fund acts as a guardrail, and for now the NDC seems willing to stay within those guardrails.
Mahama’s team also moved to restore principles of good governance and accountability that many felt were eroded in the prior administration. Under Akufo-Addo’s NPP, Ghana’s democratic credentials took a hit – from incidents of media repression and corruption scandals to perceptions of executive overreach. The new government has tried to draw a clear contrast. One of Mahama’s flagship promises has been an ambitious constitutional reform agenda to rebalance power and strengthen institutions. With his party commanding about two-thirds of Parliament’s seats, he has a rare mandate to pursue changes that have stalled for decades. The 1992 constitution, critics argue, concentrates excessive authority in the presidency – enabling patronage networks and weakening checks and balances. Mahama has pledged to correct this by, for example, curbing the president’s power to appoint hundreds of officials and ensuring a truly independent electoral commission and judiciary. These reforms, if fulfilled, would address some of the systemic issues that allowed the previous government to entrench its influence.
Already, there are signs of a different tone in governance. The new administration has replaced key officials widely seen as partisan holdovers – for instance, initiating the removal of controversial electoral commission figures appointed by the last government. It has also signaled intent to empower anti-graft bodies: President Mahama warned his ministers that any whiff of corruption or underperformance would result in swift dismissal. Such rhetoric is familiar (every incoming Ghanaian president vows to fight corruption), but citizens and civil society are watching closely for action to match the words. At the very least, the atmosphere for media and dissent has improved from the chilled climate under Akufo-Addo. Journalists who were once detained or intimidated for criticizing the government now operate with less fear. And Ghana’s tradition of a free press – which had slipped in rankings – is being consciously revived by the NDC leadership as part of its effort to re-legitimize democratic norms. These steps, combined with the peaceful transfer of power in January 2025, have somewhat buoyed Ghana’s image as a stable democracy in a West African neighborhood marred by coups.
Signs of a “Reset” – or Business as Usual?
For all the hopeful talk of a “reset” under Mahama, there are growing questions about how deep the change really goes. Critics note that many of the NDC’s early achievements rest on a foundation of fortunate circumstances and continuity, rather than bold new initiatives. High global prices for Ghana’s chief exports (gold and cocoa) have provided a windfall that any government would have gladly used. The commodities boom in 2025 significantly swelled export earnings and helped strengthen the cedi, doing much of the heavy lifting in taming inflation. In essence, the NDC benefited from a rebound largely driven by external factors – a bounce that might have occurred under an NPP government as well. Meanwhile, the underlying structure of Ghana’s economy remains much as it was: heavily dependent on raw commodities, with chronic trade imbalances and a high debt overhang. Transformative changes, such as diversifying the export base or industrializing beyond mining and agriculture, are not yet evident beyond slogans in policy documents.
The government’s flagship economic initiatives have so far been long on rhetoric but short on tangible progress. Mahama’s campaign trumpeted ideas like a “24-hour economy” policy (to boost productivity by extending business hours) and ambitious plans to create millions of jobs through value addition in agriculture and manufacturing. One year on, these remain mostly concepts on paper. Major “transformation” programs – if announced at all – have yet to move past the inaugural workshop stage, prompting accusations that the NDC is merely repackaging old promises. For example, a much-vaunted youth employment drive has yet to significantly dent the high youth unemployment rate that both parties bemoaned while in opposition. In practice, the government’s economic focus has been dominated by the urgent task of stabilization, leaving little room for bold innovation. This is understandable given the dire straits Ghana was in; yet Ghanaians have heard similar promises of diversification and industrialization from successive governments, only to see little change in the economic fundamentals. The risk is that once the macroeconomic house is in order, the political will for deeper reforms will dissipate, as has happened before.
A look at the composition of Mahama’s cabinet and inner circle further tempers the notion of wholesale change. While the President included a mix of veteran hands and younger technocrats in his team, many observers see continuity outweighing renewal. Several key figures from Mahama’s 2012–2017 administration are back in prominent roles. Their presence underscores Mahama’s reliance on trusted loyalists with “institutional knowledge,” but it also brings baggage from the past. Some of these returning officials were associated with the very shortcomings that tarnished the NDC’s reputation previously. For instance, the new Education Minister, Haruna Iddrisu, was entangled in a parliamentary bribery scandal years ago, and the new Justice Minister, Dominic Ayine, raised eyebrows by swiftly dropping certain corruption prosecutions initiated under the prior government. Such moves have fueled public skepticism that accountability might still yield to political expediency. In short, the faces at the helm are largely familiar, and so are the dynamics.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the NDC’s lackluster adherence to its own lofty ideals on inclusion and meritocracy. Despite campaigning on fresh leadership and gender equity, the Mahama administration has fallen short of expectations in forming a “different” kind of government. Out of 19 core cabinet ministers, only two are women, barely 10% – a glaring shortfall below the legally mandated 30% threshold for women in top government positions. This drew immediate criticism even from some of Mahama’s allies. The Speaker of Parliament (himself an NDC stalwart) and opposition figures alike bemoaned the backslide, pointing out that numerous capable women in the ruling party were passed over for leadership roles. “Our women cannot be second-class appointees,” admonished Alexander Afenyo-Markin, a minority leader, noting that Mahama had reneged on his campaign pledge of 30% female appointments. This episode reinforced the impression that when push comes to shove, the NDC defaults to the same patronage calculus as always – prioritizing trusted men from its ranks for plum positions, even at the expense of its progressive promises.
Old Ghosts: Galamsey and Corruption Fears
If some of the early stumbles of the new government have been in style or emphasis, others are more substantive and worrisome. A major concern is emerging in the fight against illegal mining, known locally as galamsey. During the campaign, Mahama and the NDC excoriated the outgoing NPP for failing to curb the rampant illicit gold mining that has devastated Ghana’s forests and rivers. Voters expected a more decisive crackdown to save the environment from further ruin. Yet, one year in, the NDC’s approach has taken a controversial turn that skeptics say amounts to capitulation. In 2025 the government created a new institution – the Ghana Gold Board, branded as “GoldBod” – which is now the sole authorized buyer of gold from small-scale miners. The idea, according to President Mahama, was to centralize gold trading and capture revenues that were previously lost to smugglers. Indeed, official gold exports spiked to record levels once GoldBod began operations, with some 55.7 tonnes of gold worth $5 billion documented in the first five months of 2025. That represents a huge windfall of foreign exchange that Ghana had been bleeding out through black-market deals. Mahama touted this as a win-win: GoldBod would ensure gold sales are traceable and taxed, while also undercutting the shadow buyers that fueled illegal mining.
However, to many observers, GoldBod looks like a devil’s bargain – one that may institutionalize the very galamsey it purports to fight. By law, GoldBod only purchases gold from licensed small-scale miners, not unlicensed galamsey operators. But on the ground, the distinction can be murky. Journalists and anti-corruption activists have raised a glaring question: If GoldBod buys all the gold from “legal” miners, where is the gold from the thousands of illegal sites going? One likely answer is into GoldBod’s coffers by proxy. Reports suggest that illegal miners simply launder their gold through compliant licensed miners, who mix illicit output with their own and sell it onward to GoldBod. In effect, the state may be indirectly financing galamsey – becoming, as one scathing op-ed put it, “the main customer” of unlawful mining by purchasing untraceable gold. If true, this means the government has abdicated its responsibility to stamp out galamsey in favor of profiting from it. “GoldBod is not the solution. Right now, it is the central bank for galamsey,” the same commentary charged, arguing that the scheme is rife for corruption and cover-ups. Officials insist they only deal with legitimate miners and have plans to use blockchain tracking to ensure traceability. But they have yet to publish detailed records of GoldBod’s suppliers and the volume each delivers – transparency measures that critics demand as proof that dirty gold isn’t simply being laundered as “legal”. Until such accountability is provided, GoldBod remains under a cloud of suspicion, seen by environmentalists as a clever rebranding of galamsey rather than a crackdown. Ghanaians remember all too well how the previous government’s much-hyped anti-galamsey task forces eventually succumbed to bribery and collusion. They fear the NDC is already sliding toward the same compromised end, despite its early rhetoric of zero tolerance.
Corruption more broadly looms as the elephant in the room. The NDC came back to power decrying the NPP’s “bare-faced corruption” and promising to cleanse public life. In its first year, the government has launched investigations into some egregious scandals of the last regime – such as dubious COVID-19 relief procurements and a controversial state-funded cathedral project – signaling that wrongdoing won’t be swept under the rug. Yet, when it comes to corruption within its own ranks, the NDC’s record gives many Ghanaians pause. It has not been forgotten that Mahama’s previous administration was itself marred by major graft scandals. During the NDC’s 2009–2016 tenure, a series of high-profile corruption cases came to light: from the GYEEDA affair (where officials siphoned off funds from a youth employment program), to the SADA scandal (where millions meant for savanna development vanished, including money to plant trees and raise guinea fowl that never materialized), to revelations of contract kickbacks and inflated procurement deals benefiting cronies. Those episodes earned the NDC a reputation for “create, loot and share” economics in the eyes of critics, and contributed to its 2016 electoral loss. Now in 2025, the party insists it has learned from past mistakes – Mahama even vowed that his new government “will end without a scandal,” an assertion greeted with raised eyebrows in some quarters. So far, no major corruption scandal has exploded under the new administration, and one hopes none will. But seasoned analysts worry that this may simply be the grace period before the old habits reassert themselves. The longer the NDC stays in power, the greater the temptation for its “hawks” and power brokers to re-emerge and dip into the public till. Already, whispers of interference in public contracts and partisan favoritism in state appointments have begun to circulate in Accra’s political circles, albeit without concrete proof yet. The acid test will come as the 2028 elections draw closer, when governing parties in Ghana historically find it hard to resist using state resources to buy political advantage.
Indeed, Ghana has seen this pattern play out time and again. In the run-up to elections, government expenditures suddenly balloon, often on populist projects or public sector pay hikes, leading to fiscal slippages that undo years of discipline. The last NDC government famously doubled the public wage bill in 2012, an election year, blowing the deficit out to 11.5% of GDP – one of the highest in Africa. The economic pain from that binge (and a subsequent commodity price slump) lingered for years, forcing Ghana into an IMF rescue in 2015 and slowing growth to a mere 4% by 2015 from a heady 15% in 2011. The NPP, for all its criticisms of the NDC, did little better in the end: by 2020, amid election spending and COVID-19, Ghana’s deficit again shot above 15% of GDP, and by 2022 the country was in debt distress with a currency crash and inflation above 50%, necessitating yet another IMF bailout. These boom-bust cycles are the true test of any “new” government. Will Mahama’s NDC break the vicious cycle or merely repeat it?
There are already warning signs. Ghana’s public debt is still unsustainably high (over 90% of GDP by some estimates), despite ongoing restructuring. Meeting IMF targets has required painful adjustments – cutting subsidies, freezing public sector hiring, and raising some taxes – which could prove politically difficult to sustain as time goes on. Social pressures are mounting for the government to ease up and spend more on development projects and job programs now that the economy is recovering. Within the NDC’s base, the grassroots expect rewards for returning the party to power, and some are impatient with the austerity. It will take uncommon political will for Mahama to resist the same temptations that eventually undid his predecessors. Thus far, the restraint has held, but history counsels skepticism. Ghana’s political culture, as a Brookings study famously described, is one where each party alternates in doling out patronage and few permanent policy gains are locked in. Infrastructure projects get abandoned by successor governments; contracts are canceled and re-awarded to cronies of the new regime, wasting resources and time. That “winner takes all” ethos still pervades the system, and it breeds a cycle of discontinuity and short-termism. None of Mahama’s early moves – prudent as they are – have yet altered this fundamental dynamic.
Staying Vigilant to Break the Cycle
For many Ghanaians, the takeaway is a need for constant vigilance. The NDC’s second chance at leadership comes with high public expectations, but also hard-earned public wariness. Ghanaians have learned to “remain alert and conscious of the devices of the enemy,” to borrow a biblical admonition. Here, the “enemy” is not a demon or a foreign invader, but the complacency, corruption, and misrule that can easily infect any ruling party if citizens drop their guard. It is a rallying call for civil society, the media, and ordinary voters to closely monitor those in power – and to speak out at the first whiff of malpractice. If the past decade taught anything, it’s that democratic accountability in Ghana cannot be taken for granted. Under the previous government, democratic norms eroded gradually: press freedoms were curtailed, partisan considerations trumped merit in public institutions, and corruption became brazen. Ghanaians do not want to see a repeat under the NDC, and so far they have been unafraid to air criticisms. Talk radio and social media buzz daily with both praise for Mahama’s successes and sharp critiques of his missteps. This persistent public scrutiny is Ghana’s best defense against backsliding. As one governance expert noted, public trust in democracy had fallen sharply between 2012 and 2024, with survey data showing satisfaction with Ghana’s democracy plummeted by 23% in that period. Reversing that trend will require the government to deliver tangible progress on the issues people care about – and for the people themselves to demand nothing less.
Those core issues remain the same ones that drove the NDC’s election victory: constitutional reform, the fight against galamsey, and an end to rampant corruption. On each of these, the clock is ticking. Mahama’s administration has initiated a new Constitutional Review Committee and consulted broadly on amending the charter. But Ghana has been down this road before – a similar reform commission a decade ago produced recommendations that largely gathered dust. Without continuous public pressure, this attempt could stall as well, especially since constitutional changes may threaten the privileges of the political elite (including the ruling party’s own). Likewise, the anti-galamsey campaign will only succeed if citizens at the local level – chiefs, farmers, youth – collaborate with authorities and refuse to allow mining in their communities. It’s a battle for hearts and minds as much as for law enforcement. The creation of GoldBod, while controversial, at least acknowledges that wiping out illegal mining requires cutting off its market. If the public keeps up pressure by demanding transparency from GoldBod and exposing any collusion, the government will be forced to either fix the flaws or scrap the scheme. And in the arena of corruption, Ghanaians have perhaps the most direct role: rejecting the normalization of graft in everyday life, and supporting institutions like the Auditor-General and Special Prosecutor to do their jobs without fear or favor. The recent decline in Ghana’s ranking on the Corruption Perceptions Index – falling to 80th globally, its worst position in years – was a national embarrassment that voters clearly factored into their decision. The NDC cannot afford to ignore that mandate. It must empower anti-corruption agencies and prosecute offenders, even if they are party insiders, to restore some faith. And citizens must insist on this, loudly.
In the final analysis, whether the Mahama administration truly heralds a new chapter or just a repeat of a tired saga will depend on choices made over the next few years. The early achievements in stabilizing Ghana’s economy and polity are real and commendable – but they are also fragile. By the fourth year of this term, the real test will come. Will we see once again the “rot” setting in, as budget discipline collapses and the cedi slides amid election-year largesse? Or will the government surprise skeptics by maintaining prudence and pushing through genuine reforms that outlast the electoral cycle? The answer is not predetermined. What is certain is that Ghanaians themselves have a crucial role in determining it. Their votes in 2024 were not a blank check; they were a down payment on specific promises – a new constitution, an end to galamsey, cleaner governance. If the NDC drifts from these goals, it risks the same wrath that befell its predecessor. And if it fulfills those promises, it will only be because a vigilant populace held it accountable every step of the way.
In a recent interview, a Ghanaian academic described the country’s politics as choosing “between six and half-dozen” – a colorful way of saying that both major parties have been more alike in their failings than either would admit. The NDC’s return to power was driven by the hope that this time might be different. As the months pass, that hope is being tempered by realism. The NDC, it appears, has not fundamentally changed as a party; its instincts for patronage and power are intact. But perhaps, with enough public vigilance, its outcomes can change. Ghana’s democracy, after all, is maturing – painfully, inconsistently, yet moving forward. The true measure of progress will be if, four years from now, Ghanaians do not feel compelled yet again to vote out a government that lost its way. Breaking the 8-year cycle of disappointment is the prize that hangs in the balance. To win it, Ghana’s leaders and citizens alike will have to stay alert, demand better, and never assume the job is finished. The early days of the NDC government have given the country a breather; it is what comes next that will determine whether Ghana is indeed resetting its trajectory or merely spinning in place on a political merry-go-round.
Mind the GAP 
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